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LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to the proceeding below are: plaintiffs/appellants Kitches & 
Zom, L.L.C and Erika E. Zom and Randy L. Zom dba ERZ Partnership (collectively 
"Kitches & Zom, L.L.C."); and defendants Yong Hwan Kim aka Kim Yong Hwan, Sah 
Kwi Suk aka Kwi Suk Kim, and Yong Woo Kim. The parties to this appeal are the 
collective Kitches & Zom (plaintiffs/appellants) and Yong Woo Kim 
(defendant/appellee). The other parties below have no interest in this appeal. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err in its determination that the plain language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1, et seq. required plaintiff to both file its abstract of judgment 
in the Registry of Judgments and record the abstract of judgment at the office of the 
county recorder in order to attach its judgment lien to the real property? [Issue preserved 
in R. at 54-106, and Tr. of 2/17/04 Hrg. at 1-11] 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and 
ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson. 977 P.2d 479, 
480 (Utah 1999). 
II. Did the trial court err in its conclusion that the language of the statue 
was unambiguous and err in its decision to not consider evidence submitted regarding the 
legislative intent and history of the judgment lien statute? [Issue preserved in R. at 54-
106, and Tr. of 2/17/04 Hrg. at 1-11] 
Standard of Review: A question of legislative intent associated with 
statutory interpretation is a matter of law, not of fact. See State v. Mitchell 824 P.2d 469, 
471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1.5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter arose when plaintiff tried to collect on a judgment obtained in 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County by filing a miscellaneous action in Davis 
County to execute on real property owned by defendant. Although plaintiff complied 
with the statutory requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(7) to create a lien 
on real property, the trial court determined Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5 required plaintiff 
to comply with a two-step process. Accordingly, the trial court determined plaintiffs lien 
was not properly perfected and granted defendant's motion to quash the Writ of 
Execution. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to quash. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff sued defendant Yong Woo Kim in the Third District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County. Judge Timothy Hansen entered judgement on March 17, 2003 in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of approximately $38,000.00 with 
interest accruing and with a provision allowing augmentation of the judgement by 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in effecting collection. (R. at 1-2) Plaintiff 
became aware that Yong Woo Kim was the sole owner of real property in Davis County, 
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and on May 9, 2003, it recorded an abstract of judgement with the Davis County Recorder 
in order to establish a lien on the real property. (R. at 1-2, 32-41) 
After the abstract of judgement was recorded with the Davis County 
Recorder on May 9, 2003, defendant Yong Woo Kim deeded the real property at issue to 
his wife, Hye Ok Kim without consideration on May 12, 2003. (R. at 117-118; Tran. of 
2/17/04 hearging at p. 8) That deed was subsequently recorded. Plaintiff filed a 
miscellaneous action in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County for the 
purpose of obtaining judicial assistance with enforcement of the Third District Court 
Judgement through Sheriffs Sale. (R. at 1-25) 
On November 25, 2003, plaintiff obtained a Writ of Execution from the 
Second District Court for the sale of defendant Kim's Davis County property which was 
located at 1106 East 400 North, Bountiful, Utah. (R. at 26-29) Defendant Kim objected 
to the Writ of Execution arguing that under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5(2) plaintiff was 
required to not only record the Third District Court Judgement with the Davis County 
Recorder but to also file the Judgement in the Registry of Judgements at the Davis County 
District Court Clerk's office. (R. at 42-44; 108-116) 
In response to defendant Kim's objection, plaintiff submitted Affidavits 
from the sponsor of the 2001 amendments to the Judgement Act, from the Davis County 
Attorney regarding his interpretation of the proper application of amended statute by the 
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Davis County Recorder, and by the Second District Court Clerk regarding the practices of 
the District Court, all to show that the additional filing argued by defendant Kim was not 
necessary or intended under the statute as amended in 2001. (R. at 49-51; 52-53; 54-105) 
A hearing on the matter was held by Judge Rodney S. Page on February 17, 
2004. On March 2, 2004, Judge Page entered an Order quashing the execution on the real 
property for the reasons argued by defendant Kim. (R. at 117-118; 119-121) Specifically, 
the trial court determined the statutory language was unambiguous in creating a two-step 
process for attaching a lien to real property and declined to consider the affidavits 
submitted by plaintiff. (Tr. at 5-8,10) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly interpreted the 
judgment lien statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1, et seq. It is undisputed that 
plaintiff recorded a proper abstract of judgment in the office of the Davis County 
Recorder on May 9, 2003. 
Notwithstanding defendant's arguments and the trial court's determination, 
the statutory language unambiguously requires a party to only record an abstract of 
judgment in order to attach a lien to real property. The trial court's interpretation of the 
statute creates conflicts between provisions, is at odds with the statute's language and 
does not follow the legislative intent. The Legislature intended to streamline the process 
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for creating liens and create one repository for all information affecting title to real 
property. Nothing in the statute or legislative history indicate uu * d* -^aure was trying 
<o iieatr a inoi ' ' i iiNibeisome process far rivaling :md s^an, hirijj, fo" Unv> on IP.I'I piropnii. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it determined the 2001 statutory amendments 
created a more cumbersome two-step process for creating liens. 
A R G U M E N I 
I. The Statute Unambiguously Requires Recording A Judgment In the 
County Recorder's Office in Order to Create 4 I ,ien On Real Property. 
1 'he trial court erred when it interpreted the unambiguous language of tl ic 
' - r * ah'meats and a recording in the office 
of the county recorder. Plaintiff ha-. a \ ahd lien auamsi the defendant's real property 
located in Davis County, I u s .^'cui-.* <; recorded .;u ai.*aa* • . -.; igmen; . = . ivv a is 
defendant's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution on the grounds that plaintiff had not 
created an enforceable interest prior to defendant conveying his interest in the siibject 
property. 
Two provisions govern the procedure for filing a lien against real property. 
First, Utah Code Ann. § 78-22 1 pro\ "ides: 
( 7)(a) After July 1, 2002, a judgment ei itered by a district 
court or a justice court in the state becomes a lien upon real 
property if: 
5 
(i) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment 
containing the information identifying the judgment debtor as 
described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) is recorded in the office 
of the county recorder; or 
(ii) the judgment or an abstract of judgment and a 
separate information statement of the judgment creditor as 
described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(5) is recorded in the office 
of the county recorder. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-l(7)(a) (2003). As will be discussed below in more detail, this 
section has historically governed the process for attaching a lien to real property. 
According to the plain language of this statute, plaintiff created an enforceable lien by 
recording the abstract of judgment with the David County Recorder. 
When the Registry of Judgments was created, the Legislature enacted Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5 provides, in its current version: 
(2) On or after July 1, 1997, a judgment entered in a district court does not 
create a lien upon or affect the title to real property unless the judgment is 
filed in the Registry of Judgments of the office of the clerk of the district 
court of the county in which the property is located. 
(3) (a) On or after July 1, 2002, except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), a 
judgment entered in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect 
the title to real property unless the judgment or an abstract of judgment 
is recorded in the office of the county recorder in which the real property 
of the judgment debtor is located. 
(b) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of 
Subsection (3)(a). 
(4) In addition to the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3)(a), any judgment 
that is filed in the Registry of Judgments on or after September 1, 1998, or 
any judgment or abstract of judgment that is recorded in the office of a 
county recorder after July 1, 2002, shall include . . . . 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 ^ -? K * 3) & (4) (2001). 
The sole que^in *n on appeal is w liethei the trial court errcu m ir-
dete rmii mtioi i that this above i eferenced stati ites reqi lire a pai t) to file ai i absti act :>f 
judgment both in the Registry of Judgments and the office of the county recorder r 
whether the statutes only requires a party attempting to lien real property a \ u 
2002 to file in tl le office of the coi ii it) i ecoi der. 
"When construing a statute, we must give effect to legislative intern " 
Versluis v. Guaranty National Companies, 842 P.2d 865, 8(>7 -Mi' ^j. * (citing West 
Jordan v. Morrisoi ? . - - • . " 
statute's plain language and only if some ambiguity exists does a court need to look 
further. See Schurtz v. BMW of North America. Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112-1115 (IJtah 
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Versluis, 842 
P.2dat867. 
In this case, tl le :p lestioi t is i .,/ hat pi o\ isions in / '8 22 1 ait id 7 78- 22 1 5 
apply to the creation of a lien after July 1, 2002. The trial court did not address 78-22-1 
and determined subsections (2) and (3) operated together rather than independently, and 
tl n is, tl ic statute i equii edbc ill i filii lgs Ii i Scl mi tz v. BM VV of North America, Inc the 
Utah Supreme Court was faced with a similar statutory interpretation, namely whether 
7 
statutory provision operated independently or dependency. See Schurtz v. BMW of 
North America. Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108. 1112-1115 (Utah 1991). 
The first thing the court looked at was the language of the statute in light of 
the context of the overall statute. See id. at 1112. In this matter, Chapter 22 is 
appropriately titled "Judgments." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1. Within Chapter 22, 
section 1 deals with the following topics: "Duration of judgment - Judgment as a lien 
upon real property - Abstract of judgment - Small claims judgment not a lien - Appeal 
of judgment - Child support orders." Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (emphasis added). 
Section 1.1 addresses judgment against a party who dies after a verdict is rendered and is 
not applicable to this issue. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.1. Next, section 1.5 is 
entitled: "Definitions - Judgment recorded in Registry of Judgments." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-22-1.5. The remaining sections of Chapter 22 have no bearing on the issues in this 
appeal. Given this context, Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 rather than 78-22-1.5 was intended 
to cover the creation of a judgment lien against real property. 
Historically, section 1.5 is new relative to section 1. Prior to 1997, all 
judgments entered in district court immediately became liens on all of the debtor's 
property in the county where the judgment was entered. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 
and historical notes. In 1997, the Utah Legislature approved Senate Bill 121 which 
created the Registry of Judgments. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5 and historical notes, 
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see also Utah Legislature Rep't 1997 Vol. 2, p. 906. With the creation of the Registry of 
Judgments, a judgment entered in district court did not become a lien on real property 
• V . : ' ^ - " 1 6C-L.5. 
When it was first enacted, section 1.5 contained only two paragraphs: 
subsection (1) defined the Registry of Judgment, and subsection (2) stated:; "On oi after 
upon or affect the title of real property unless the judgment is recorded in the RCLH^P . -r 
Judgments of the office of the clerk of the district court of the county ; .• the 
proper!:) is 1< H::::J i/l .< : i 1 " " I Ill i i t i O n 1< )i Vt :n i § ; 8 22 1 5 ( 1 9 9 / ) IE h u t:I i< • '• 1 was 
modified in 1997 to indicate that only judgments filed prior to Ju v ., iJ91 created liens 
on real property. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1997) In creating the Registry of 
Judgments and enacting section 1 1 •. IM1|HHI.HII IN II. I- llul IL I1'** ' u IMOII rf 
section 1 contained no reference to the Registry r^  f Mdements and did not set forth the 
procedure for creating a lien on real property after July - < oo*7. See T Ttah Code Ann. § 
/8»22» i (I *)() /1 Accordingly, between 199 7 and 2002, i i|:i,i i l l "' 'i M i t ; ' % m i sf 78 22 1 5 
governed the process for attaching a lien against real property and required only a filing 
the judgment in the Registry of Judgments. 
In 2001, the I legislature passed House Bill 305, \:v hicli modified both 
sec tioii 1 and sectioi I 1 5 (II at 88-96) Specifically, section 1 5 v 'as amended to include 
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subsection (3) which changed the requirement for attaching a lien to real property. 
Additionally, section 1 was modified to include subsection (7) which set forth 
requirements for filing a lien against real property. As amended and in their current 
versions, both subsection (3) to section 1.5 and subsection (7) to section 1 provide the 
same procedure for attaching a judgment lien to real property after July 1, 2002: A 
judgment becomes a lien on real property if it is recorded in the office of the county 
recorder. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-22-1(7) & -1.5(3). The 2001 modifications to 
section 1 still do not contain any reference to the Registry of Judgments, nor is there any 
reference to any provision which would require filing the judgment in the Registry of 
Judgment in order to lien real property. Both statutes only require recording in the office 
of the county recorder in order to create a judgment lien on real property. 
Examining the plain language of the statutory provisions in the context of 
the related statutes and history of the amendments, the Utah Legislature intended to 
change the requirements for creating a lien on real property. Prior to 1997, a lien was 
created automatically upon entry of a judgment in district court. Between 1997 and 2002, 
a lien was created only if the judgement was filed in the Registry of Judgments. After 
2002, a lien is created only by recording the judgment in the office of the county recorder. 
The plain language and history of the statute indicate subsections (2) and (3) of section 
1.5 are meant to be read independently of one another. The Legislature did not include 
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any language to indicate recording the judgment was an extra requirement in addition to 
filing the judgment. 
When interpreting the plain language of the statute, the court must look at 
the language in the context of the related statutory provisions. See Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 
1112. Furthermore, the court must "construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect 
to all their terms, where possible." IdL Construing the statutes as dependent on one 
another, as the district court did, would create conflict between statutory provisions and 
force strained readings of other provisions. The only way to harmonize the requirements 
in section 1 with section 1.5 is to read subsections (2) and (3) of section 1.5 
independently. To read them as dependent and creating a two-step process is at odds with 
subsection (7) of section 1. Specifically, subsection (7) of section 1 sets forth the 
requirements for creating a lien on real property. The only requirement in subsection (7) 
is to record the judgment in office of the county recorder in accordance with the notice 
and content provisions of subsections (4) or (5) of section 1.5. Because subsection (7) 
sets forth the requirements for creating a lien and does not require filing the judgment in 
the Registry of Judgments, the trial court's interpretation creates a conflict between 
sections 1 and 1.5. For this reason, subsections (2) and (3) of section 1.5 should be read 
to operate independently of one another in order to avoid this conflict. 
Subsection (4) in section 1.5 also indicates the provisions are to operate 
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independently. Subsection (4) states: "In addition to the requirements of Subsections (2) 
and (3)(a), any judgment that is filed in the Registry of Judgments on or after September 
1, 1998, or any judgment or abstract of judgment that is recorded in the office of a county 
recorder after July 1, 2002, shall include . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5(4) (2001) 
(emphasis added). If both filing and recording were required, the Legislature would have 
used the word "and11 rather than "or." The word "or" indicates that the Legislature was 
intended to require filing in one place or the other, not both. 
Because a statute should be construed according to its plain language, to 
give proper meaning to each term and to harmonize all provisions, the district court erred 
when it concluded Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5 required plaintiff to file the abstract of 
judgment both in the Registry of Judgments and to record the abstract of judgment at the 
office of the county recorder. Plaintiff had a valid lien as of May 9, 2003 when it 
recorded the abstract of judgment in the Davis County Recorder's Office. Accordingly, 
the trial court erred in granting defendant's Motion to Quash. 
II. The Legislative History Supports Plaintiffs Interpretation of the 
Judgment Lien Statute. 
In addition to the plain language of the statute, the Legislative history of the 
2001 amendments also indicates that subsections (2) and (3) should be read 
independently. "For assistance in ascertaining the meaning of statutory language, we look 
to the background and general purpose of the statute." Versluis v. Guaranty National 
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Companies. 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992) (citing Jamison v Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 
559 P.2d 958, 959 (Utah 1977)). Specifically, the history of the statute indicates an 
attempt to create one central repository for judgment liens on real property. Those 
performing title searches needed a more expedient system to verify clean titles. Because 
a title search must include a search at the county recorder's office, it makes sense to 
require a judgment lien to be recorded at the recorder's office. 
The trial court's interpretation of the statute does not make sense in light of 
the objectives of the statute. The statute is in place to ensure notice to the debtor and 
notice to anyone else interested in the title of subject property. The obvious place to 
check is at the recorder's office. Nevertheless, defendant and the trial court would place 
one more hoop into the process. This hoop would serve no purpose, as all the necessary 
searches on property can be done at the recorder's office. Accordingly, interpreting the 
statute to require a two-step process does nothing more than create another technicality 
for anyone trying to recover a judgment. In this respect, it is important to note that those 
performing title searches and those trying to enforce valid judgments are often not 
attorneys. Nevertheless, to read the statutory provisions in 78-22-1.5 as dependent, would 
require lawyers and non-lawyers alike to reconcile the conflicting provisions of 78-22-
1(7) with 78-22-1.5(2) & (3). In amending the statute in 2002, it is hard to imagine the 
Legislature making amendments which add procedural technicalities and inconsistencies 
13 
into the statute,. 
The Legislative history shows that the legislature intended to shift judgment 
filings from the office of the court clerk to the recorder. This modification was needed to 
assist title companies searching the records for judgment liens. (R. at 49-50) Previously, 
researchers would visit the clerk's office to locate liens, but with the advent of electronic 
filing, multiple court sites, expansion of the court system and the archaic archive system 
still employed in many rural areas, researchers found it difficult if not impossible to locate 
judgment liens. To rectify this problem, the bill, codified in the above statute, provided 
that a judgment or abstract of judgment constituted a lien when it was recorded in the 
office of the county recorder. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 & -1.5. (R. at 49-50) 
Also, fiscal notes issued during the bill's consideration demonstrate the 
Legislature's intention to assist title researchers and to transition filings from the office of 
the court clerk to the office of the recorder. "If abstracts are no longer filed with the 
Courts due to passage of this bill there could be a potential loss of General Fund 
revenue." (R. at 98-99) "Passage of this bill would result in cost savings to title 
companies resulting from the time savings on research related to liens on property." (R. 
at 98-99) There is no indication from any of these sources that the Legislature intended 
to create a requirement of filing in the Registry of Judgments in addition to recording 
with the county recorder. Such a rule would increase the cost of researching title and 
14 
make it more cumbersome. 
Finally, interviews of the clerks of the court reveal that the clerks do not 
advise the public to file in both places, and they only recognize liens against real property 
if the judgment or abstract has been filed with the county recorder. (R. at 101-02) 
Likewise, the county recorder confirms that judgments need to be filed solely in his office 
to be a valid lien against real property. (R. at 101-02) Further, the Davis County attorney 
acknowledges that the "process used in Davis County for recording and establishing 
judgment liens requires only the filing of a judgment or abstract of judgment with the 
county recorder and does not require any filing with the clerk of the court." (R. at 104-
05) 
In short, the Legislature intended to simplify and centralize the process for 
filing and locating liens. The 2001 amendments to the statute were not an attempt to 
make it more cumbersome to create and search for liens. Accordingly, both Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-22-1 & -1.5 were amended to reflect the legislative intent to streamline the 
process by requiring all real property liens to be recorded in the office of the county 
recorder. Upon recording the required information, the statute unambiguously provides in 
two separate provisions that a lien attaches to real property without any further filings. 
The trial court's ruling which creates a more cumbersome process is at odds with the 
language and intent and was in error. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, plaintiff/appellant requests this 
court to reverse the trial court's interpretation of the judgment lien statute and reverse its 
grant of defendant's motion to quash. 
DATED this 3 day of SepkuXeJ^OO^ 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
OBERT L. STEVENS 
ACHARY E. PETERSON 
'Attorneys for Appellants 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid on this 3 day of 
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Susan C. Noyce 
Susan C. Noyce, P.C. 
1807 East Maple Hill Drive 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART III. Procedure 
CHAPTER 22. JUDGMENT 
78-22-1 Duration of judgment —Judgment as a lien upon real property — 
Abstract of judgment —Small claims judgment not a lien —Appeal of judgment 
— Child support orders. 
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court 
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in 
accordance with law. 
(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections (4) and (5), the entry 
of judgment by a district court creates a lien upon the real property of the 
judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence 
of the judgment, located in the county in which the judgment is entered. 
(3) An abstract of judgment issued by the court in which the judgment is entered 
may be filed in any court of this state and shall have the same force and effect 
as a judgment entered in that court. 
(4) Prior to July 1, 1997, and after May 15, 1998, a judgment entered in the small 
claims division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon real property unless 
abstracted to the civil division of the district court and recorded in accordance 
with Subsection (3). 
(5) (a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit, with the court where the 
notice of appeal is filed, of cash or other security in a form and amount 
considered sufficient by the court that rendered the judgment to secure the 
full amount of the judgment, together with ongoing interest and any other 
anticipated damages or costs, including attorney's fees and costs on appeal, 
the lien created by the judgment shall be terminated as provided in Subsection 
(5) (b) . 
(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection (5) (a) , 
the court shall enter an order terminating the lien created by the judgment 
and granting the judgment creditor a perfected lien in the deposited security 
as of the date of the original judgment. 
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(6) (a) A child support order or a sum certain judgment for past due support 
may be enforced: 
d) within four years after the date the youngest child reaches majority; 
or 
(n) eight years from the date of entry of the sum certain judgment 
entered by a tribunal. 
(b) The longer period of duration shall apply in every order. 
(c) A sum certain judgment may be renewed to extend the duration. 
(7) (a) After July 1, 2002, a judgment entered by a district court or a 
justice court in the state becomes a lien upon real property if: 
(I) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment containing the information 
identifying the judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) is 
recorded in the office of the county recorder; or 
(n) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment and a separate 
information statement of the judgment creditor as described in Subsection 
78-22-L.5(5) is recorded in the office of the county recorder. 
(b) The judgment shall run from the date of entry by the district court or 
justice court. 
(c) The real property subject to the lien includes all the real property of 
the judgment debtor: 
(I) in the county in which the recording under Subsection (7) (a) (I) or 
(n) occurs; and 
(n) owned or acquired at any time by the judgment debtor during the time 
the judgment is effective. 
(d) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of Subsection 
(7) (a) . 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://print.westlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atD&dataid=A00558000000R1S6000?l1Q164R Q/?/?00d 
A ci£V/ -r V/A x \J 
UT ST § 78-22-1 Page 3 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-22-1 
(8) (a) A judgment referred to in Subsection (7) shall be entered under the 
name of the judgment debtor in the judgment index in the office of the county 
recorder as required in Section 17-21-6. 
(b) A judgment containing a legal description shall also be abstracted in the 
appropriate tract index in the office of the county recorder. 
History: C. 1953, 78-22-1, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 127, § 15; 1997, ch. 96, § 1; 
1998, ch. 327, § 2; 1999, ch. 75, § 1; 2000, ch. 161, § 20; 2001, ch. 370, § 6; 
2003, ch. 176, § 13. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1992, ch. 127, § 15 repeals former § 78-22-1, as 
last amended by L. 1977, ch. 77, § 69, relating to a lien of judgment, and enacts 
the present section, effective April 27, 1992. 
Amendment Notes. —The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted 
"recorded" for "filed and docketed" in Subsection (3); and in Subsection (4) added 
"and after May 15, 1998" near the beginning, substituted "abstracted to the civil 
division of the district court and recorded" for "filed and docketed," and deleted 
the last sentence which read "This Subsection (4) shall apply to all small claims 
judgments entered on or after April 27, 1992." 
The 1999 amendment, effective March 17, 1999, substituted "Subsections (4) and 
(5)" for "Subsection (4)" in Subsection (2) and added Subsection (5). 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added "Except as provided in Subsection 
(6)" in Subsection (1) and added Subsection (6). 
The 2001 amendment, effective July 1, 2002, inserted "from the date of entry in a 
court" m Subsection (1), added Subsections (7) and (8), and made stylistic 
changes. 
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, deleted "Except as provided in 
Subsection (6)" at the beginning of Subsection (1), substituted "or a sum certain 
judgment for past due support may be enforced" for "may be pursued at any time" in 
Subsection (6) (a), added Subsections (6)(a)(n), (6)(b), and (6)(c), and made 
stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. —Execution, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69. 
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Page 1 
UTAH CODE, 195 3 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART III. Procedure 
CHAPTER 22. JUDGMENT 
78-22-1.5 Definitions -Judgment recorded in Registry of Judgments. 
(1) For purposes of this section, "Registry of Judgments" means the index where a 
judgment shall be filed and searchable by the name of the judgment debtor through 
electronic means or by tangible document. 
(2) On or after July 1, 1997, a judgment entered in a district court does not 
create a lien upon or affect the title to real property unless the judgment is 
filed in the Registry of Judgments of the office of the clerk of the district 
court of the county in which the property is located. 
(3) (a) On or after July 1, 2002, except as provided in Subsection (3) (b) , a 
judgment entered in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect the 
title to real property unless the judgment or an abstract of judgment is 
recorded in the office of the county recorder in which the real property of 
the judgment debtor is located. 
(b) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of Subsection 
(3) (a) . 
(4) In addition to the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3) (a) , any judgment 
that is filed in the Registry of Judgments on or after September 1, 1998, or any 
judgment or abstract of judgment that is recorded in the office of a county 
recorder after July 1, 2002, shall include: 
(a) the information identifying the judgment debtor on the judgment or 
abstract of judgment; or 
(b) a copy of the separate information statement of the judgment creditor that 
contains: 
(I) the correct name and last-known address of each judgment debtor and 
the address at which each judgment debtor received service of process; 
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(n) the name and address of the judgment creditor; 
( m ) the amount of the judgment as filed in the Registry of Judgments; 
(iv) if known, the judgment debtor's social security number, date of 
birth, and driver's license number if a natural person; and 
(v) whether or not a stay of enforcement has been ordered by the court and 
the date the stay expires. 
(5) For the information required in Subsection (4), the judgment creditor shall: 
(a) provide the information on the separate information statement if known or 
available to the judgment creditor from its records, its attorney's records, 
or the court records in the action in which the judgement was entered; or 
(b) state on the separate information statement that the information is 
unknown or unavailable. 
(6) (a) Any judgment that requires payment of money and is entered in a 
district court on or after September 1, 1998, or any judgment or abstract of 
judgment recorded in the office of a county recorder after July 1, 2002, that 
does not include the debtor identifying information as required in Subsection 
(4) is not a lien until a separate information statement of the judgment 
creditor is recorded in the office of a county recorder in compliance with 
Subsections (4) and (5). 
(b) The separate information statement of the judgment creditor referred to m 
Subsection (6)(a) shall include: 
(I) the name of any judgment creditor, debtor, assignor, or assignee; 
(n) the date of recording; and 
( m ) the entry number of the original judgment or abstract of judgment. 
(7) A judgment that requires payment of money recorded on or after September 1, 
1998, but prior to July 1, 2002, has as its priority the date of entry, except as 
to parties with actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment. 
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(8) A judgment or notice of judgment wrongfully filed against real property is 
subject to Title 38, Chapter 9, Wrongful Liens. 
History: C. 1953, 78-22-1.5, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 96, § 2; 1998, ch. 327, § 3; 
2001, ch. 306, § 1; 2001, ch. 370, § 7. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. —The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsections 
(3) to (6) . 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 306, effective April 30, 2001, added the exception at 
the end of Subsection (6) and added Subsection (7). 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 370, effective July 1, 2002, rewrote the section to 
require recording the judgment or abstract of judgment with the county recorder 
and to further specify the requirements for the separate information statement. 
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-22-1.5, UT ST § 78-22-1.5 
Statutes current through the 2004 Third Special Session. Annotations current 
through 2004 UT 27 (4/1/2004); 2004 UT APP 102 (4/1/2004) and April 1, 2004 
(Federal Cases). 
Copyright © 2004 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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SUSAN C.NOYCE (#6119) 
j . GARRY MCALLISTER (#2139) 
1807 East Maple Hills Drive 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Telephone: (801)299-8678 
Fax: (801)299-8678 
Attorneys for Defendant YONG WOO KIM 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KITCHES & ZORN, L.L.C. a Utah limited 
liability company, and ERIKA E. ZORN and 
RANDY L. ZORN dba ERZ PARTNERSHIP ORDER QUASHING PLAINTIFF'S 
: WRIT OF EXECUTION 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : Civil No. 036702072 
YONG HWAN KIM aka KIM YONG HWAN, Judge Rodney S. Page 
SAK KWI SUK aka KWISUK KIM and 
YONG WOO KIM, : 
Defendants. 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Writ of Execution came on for hearing on Tuesday, 
February 17. 2004 before the Honorable Rodney S. Page. Counsel of record Russell C. Ferricks 
and Ramona E. Garcia of Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson were present and represented 
plaintiff. Counsel of record Susan C. Noyce was present and represented defendant, Yong Woo 
Kim. 
The parties having previously briefed the Court in the matter presented their arguments. 
The Court after being fully advised enters the following: 
Order Quashing Plaintiffs Writ of Execution 




mf?702072 KIM.YONG HWAN 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1.. On March 17, 2003, judgment on behalf of plaintiff against defendant, Yong Woo 
Kim, was entered in Third District Court in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. On May 9,2003, plaintiff recorded the judgment against defendant in the office of the 
Davis County Recorder. 
3. On May 12, 2003, Yong Woo Kim executed a Quit Claim Deed quitclaiming his 
interest in real property located at 1106 East 400 North, Bountiful, Utah to his wife, 
Hye Ok Kim. The deed was recorded on May 19, 2003 and then recorded again on 
June 13. 2003. 
4. On July 29, 2003, plaintiff filed an abstract of the judgment obtained in Third District 
Court along with the debtor information sheet with the clerk of the Second District 
Court in Davis County. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Section 78-22-1.5 of the Utah Code Ann. requires a two-step process in order to 
create a lien on real property. The judgment must be recorded in the office of the 
County Recorder in the county in which the property is located and filed in the 
Registry of Judgments in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county in 
which the property is located. 
2. A judgment lien upon a debtor's real property is not perfected until both steps of 78-
22-1.5 U.C.A. are taken. 
3. The requirements and language of 78-22-1.5 U.C.A. are not ambiguous. 
4. Plaintiffs judgment lien did not attach to the property quitclaimed to Mrs. Kim 
because plaintiff did not complete the second step required by 78-22-1.5 U.C.A. until 
Julv 29. 2003. 
5. Plaintiff has no perfected nor enforceable judgment lien on the property located at 
1106 East 400 North Bountiful, Utah. 
ORDER 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that defendant's motion to quash the plaintiffs Writ of Execution is granted. 
DATED this £^_ day of rM(Uck , 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
1 ST/Tp \%t 
District Court f$k ~ C]C \ ^ 
Approved as to form: | *£ \ .
 t2.! / O j 
*,c£\ U i A H /coj 
v -^ w 
By ' V ^ w * " ^ 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER 
QUASHING PLAINTIFF'S WRIT OF EXECUTION, was mailed, via U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, this 18th day of February, 2004, to the plaintiffs attorneys at the following address: 
Russell C. Ferricks 
Ramona E. Garcia 
RICHARDS, BRANDT. MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street. 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
- 3 ^ • ^ ? %1^L / i /?/L/. 
2nd District - Farmington^COURT 
DAVIS * COUNTY A STAlfe OF^  UTAH! 
KITCHES & ZORlf* LLC - Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case: NoT036702072 A»I 
Judge: RODNEY Sf PAGE . 




Plaintiff's Attorney(s) :• RUSSELU C.FERICKS 
. RAMONA E;GARCIA 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SUSAN'C NOYCES 
Video 
Tape Numberr 2/17/04 Tape Count*: 10:31 
HEARING^ 
TAPE: 2/17/04 COUNT: 10:31 
This is the Jtime set*for hearing on defendant's objection to 
plaintiff's Writ of Execution, 
Ms. Noyce presents argument* 
Ms. Garcia presents argument. 
COUNT; 101:41 
The Courto/rules as follows: The Court is aware of^ ther^  evolution:*• 
of the iawiiregarding* liens. Statute 78-22-1 is* referenced! In ttii 
past, a lien was* automatically attached when a judgment entered. 
Now, the mere entry of jugment does not constitute a lien on real 
property unless other steps are taken. 
After July 1, 1997, a lien was not created unless it was filed in 
the Registry of Judgments in the District Court in the county in 
which the property is located. 
After July 1, 2002, (except regarding Subsection 3B)^ the law, was 
revised so that a judgment does not become-a lien unless^ it was^^ 
also filed with the County Recorder" in'the county in which, the^  real 
property is located. 
Page 1 
2 JnA 
Case No: 036702072 
Date^^ft Fefc*Tl7^ 2004 
[ i l ings i and£ theCquitclain 
[attached.to'thejproperty4 
,JThe Motion^to£ Quash r t? Kim p^HBi 
granted. 
This^ralihg^does not, precludefc>th^pla£ntif f_fronf pursuing a claim 
of frai^duient/conveyance^ 
Mr: FerickslRepresentsCthar^thafircIaiWhas been;f i led . 
Ms. Noyce^is^to prepare the < order frora^ today's hearing and submit 
i t to "opposing- counsel- at: l e a s t ' f i ve days prior to i t s submission? 
to the Court for signature. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 





OBJECTION HEARING FEBRUARY 17, 2004 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 E. Ellen Way 





For the Plaintiff: RUSSELL C. FERICKS j 
RAMONA E. GARCIA 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, | 
MILLER & NELSON | 
j 
For the Defendant: SUSAN C.NOYCE | 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
* * * 
1 ! FARMINGTON, UTAH; TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2004 
2 J HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This 
5 is the time set for argument in the matter of Kitches & Zorn 
6 j vs. Kim. This is in regards to an execution which was filed 
7 I and objection filed thereto by the defendants. 
8 Counsel, will you state your names for the record 
9 please? 
10 MR. FERICKS: Your Honor, Russell Fericks and Ramona 
11 Garcia on behalf of the plaintiff, Kitches & Zorn. 
12 MS. NOYCE: Susan Noyce, Your Honor, on behalf of 
13 defendant Yong Hwan Kim. 
14 THE COURT: Ms. Noyce, this started out as your 
15 motion, so you may speak to it if you'd like to. 
16 MS. NOYCE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
17 j Your Honor, whereas both sides have briefed the court 
18 on this matter, I won't recite the facts or any of that. Our 
19 position is the same that it has always been. The statute, 
20 78-22-1.5 requires that in order to have a judgment lien 
21 i against real property there are two requirements: recording in j 
22 the office of the county recorder's office and docketing in the | 
23 | district court. We believe that both requirements are 
24 I necessary and that without both of them for any judgment 
i 
25 entered after July 19, 1997 and a judgment entered after July 
1 j 2002 you cannot have a valid lien against real property. We 
I 
2 j believe that this statute goes hand in hand with Rule 69 
3 j regarding writs of execution. In order to obtain a writ of 
4 I execution, you must present to the court clerk evidence of I 
5 I having docketed the judgment. Without docketing the judgment, j 
6 they will not issue a writ of execution. Plaintiff has argued 
7 j that you only need one - one requirement under that statute and 
8 that it is recording with the county recorder's office. 
9 j However, if that were true they would not have been able to get 
10 I the writ of execution. They complied with both steps. They 
11 complied with the first step, recording, in May of 2003. They 
12 j complied with the second step in July - at the end of July. By 
13 that time the defendant had no interest in real property. 
14 We believe that just logically if we are to take 
15 plaintiff's position that you only need one requirement, that 
16 of recording in the office of the county recorder's office in 
17 order to obtain a judgment lien, you would essentially have a 
18 judgment lien that you couldn't do anything with. It would be 
19 no good for you. You couldn't execute upon it. It's just not 
20 a logical position. We believe that the rule is clear, it 
21 j requires both; recording in the county recorder, docketing in 




valid lien. And if you have no valid lien, you cannot execute 
upon it. And we believe that plaintiff at the time it filed 
its writ of execution, there was nothing for it to execute 
2 
upon. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Who would like to speak for the defense in this 
matter? Ms. Garcia. 
MS. GARCIA: Your Honor, the cardinal rule of 
statutory interpretation is determining the intent of the 
legislature. The Supreme Court has told us over and over again 
that the best way of determining the intent of the legislature 
is to look at the plain language of the statute. Paragraph 
three in 78-22-1.5 states that after July of 2002 to obtain a 
lien a judgment needs to be filed in the county recorder's 
office. It does not state that it needs to be filed in the 
county recorder's office and with the clerk of the court. It 
does not join paragraph two and three by an and or in addition 
to, it simply states that after 2002 filing in the county 
recorder's office is the way to obtain a lien. We filed our 
judgment in 2003 which is after 2002, so we complied with the 
statutory requirements. 
In the defendant's memo she stated that paragraph 
four shows that compliance requires dual recordation because it 
says subsection two and subsection 3A, but if you read further 
in paragraph four, it also states that any judgment that is 
filed in the registry of judgments on or after September 1, 
1998 or any judgment or abstract of judgment that is recorded 
in the office of the county recorder after July of 2002 shall 
include certain information about the debtor. 
And it is our position that the language of the 
statute clearly indicates that after 2002 filing in the 
recorder's office is the full requirement for obtaining a 
judgment lien. The writ of execution that the defendant 
referred to, the writ does not create the lien. We need to 
file in the court in order to execute on the lien, but the 
issue is whether or not we had a valid lien at the time that we 
recorded with the county recorder, and according to the 
statute, we did have a valid lien. We're asking the court for 
a reasonable interpretation of the statute. 
Now, the legislature part of their job is to 
harmonize the various books, code sections. The legislature 
would not make it more difficult for any party to obtain a 
lien. If you look at 78-22-1.5 and 78-22-1, to harmonize those 
two sections requires that recording with the county recorder 
is the only place that a creditor need file a judgment in order 
to obtain a lien. Specifically in 78-22-1 paragraph two 
specifies that prior to July of 1997 that a lien should be 
filed with the district court. Paragraph seven of that same 
code section specifies after July 2002 a judgment entered by a 
district court or a justice court becomes a lien upon real 
property if the judgment or abstract of judgment is recorded in 
the office of the county recorder. 
If any of this seems ambiguous, Your Honor, then I 
4 
1 j direct your attention to the affidavits of the county recorder 
2 i and of Senator Hatch who sponsored the amendments to the 
3 judgment lien statute, wherein they both say that the purpose 
















THE COURT: Thank you. 
Response, Ms. Noyce. 
MS. NOYCE: Your Honor, our argument remains the 
same. Had the legislature truly wanted to require only 
recording in the office of the county recorder after July 2002, 
it would have been a simple matter to amend paragraph two to 
say on or after July 1, 1997 and prior to July 1, 2002 that it 
would then limit that time period. It didn't do that. Believe 
that given the impact on the general revenue fund that I 
believe was cited to by plaintiffs, that regardless of what 
Senator Hatch envisioned, the rest of the legislature still 
required two filings, that in the county recorder's office and 
that in the court clerk's office. 
Ms. Garcia is correct that Rule 69 does not create 
the judgment lien. However, it does provide procedure to 
i 
20 j execute against a judgment lien. And until you docket it, you I 
21 
22 
have somewhat of a worthless lien. We believe that that is the 
coordination between the statutes that should be read. 
23 I THE COURT: Well, the Court will rule as follows in 
24 
25 
this matter. First of all, this Court has some substantial 
history in the development - not the development necessarily, 
1 , but the evolution of the law in regards to liens. Early on and 
2 I until recently the mere fact that a judgment was entered in 
3 | either a justice court or a district court in a particular 
4 I county would result automatically in a lien being attached to j 
5 I real property which existed in that county. That lien could be I 
I i 
6 | - that judgment could be filed in any other county in the state ! 
7 j and that same effect would occur even in those counties, even j 
! 
I 
8 j though that is not where the judgment which originally granted, i 
9 Our legislature in its wisdom saw fit to depart from 
10 that original law a number of years ago by making it a 
11 requirement that mere entry of a judgment in a court, even one 
12 I of record, did not constitute a lien on real property unless 
13 another step was taken. 
14 The court would just cite what the Supreme Court has 
15 stated as far as the statutory interpretation. It is stated 
16 that in construing the statute you must assume that each term 
17 of the statute was used advisedly and that statutory words are 
18 read literally unless such reading is unreasonable confusing or 
19 inoperable. Only when you find an ambiguity in the statutes 
20 | plain language need we seek guidance from legislative history 
21 I and relevant policy considerations. 
22 j Looking at the statute before the Court it is clear 
23 to the Court that if you read, first of all you start over in 
24 78-22-1 and it talks about the duration of a judgment, it talks j 
25 j about a judgment entered in a court, may be filed in any court 
j ! 
! 6i 
1 ! of the state, and it shall have the same force and effect as a ! 
• 
2 judgment entered in that court. Then you go over and you look ' 
i 
3 I at 78-22-1.5 and it clearly states in paragraph two that on or , 
4 after July 1, 1997 a judgment entered in a district court does 
! 
I ' 5 not create a lien upon or affect a title to real property j 
6 I unless the judgment is filed in the registry of judgments of [ 
7 j the office of the clerk of the district court of the county in 
8 I which the property is located. So it's got to be filed in the 
9 j registry of judgments whether it's in the county in which the 
10 judgment is granted or another county. That's the first step. 
11 It goes on to say although that's what you have to 
12 have before it can affect a title to real property, after July 
13 1, 2002, except as provided in subsection 3B which has to do 
14 with governmental agencies, a judgment entered in a district 
15 court does not create a lien upon or affect a title to real 
16 property unless the judgment or abstract of judgment is 
17 recorded in the office of the county recorder in which the real 
18 property of the judgment debtor is located. 
19 The court would find that those provisions are clear 
20 and unambiguous and that the law contemplates a two step 
21 process. In this particular matter - before that lien is 
22 perfected - in this particular matter the evidence is 
23 | uncontroverted that the plaintiffs in fact recorded a judgment 
24 j here in Davis County in the county recorder's office on May 
25 I 9th. Apparently there was some deeds that were exchanged and 
7 
the first of those deeds transferring the title out of Mr. Kim 
occurred on May 19 and apparently was re-recorded on June 13 of 
2003, and then subsequent to that time plaintiff filed a copy 
of the judgment with the district court here in Davis County in 
the registry of judgments. 
The Court would find that that lien was not perfected 
until both of those steps were taken, that is the filing with 
the district court and the filing with the county recorder. 
The Court therefore finds that that lien had not attached - did 
not attach to the property of, I believe it's Mrs. Kim that was 
conveyed to her prior to the June 29 date. Therefore, the 
Court will grant the defendant's motion to quash the execution 
in this particular case and as I've indicated before, this 
doesn't preclude the filing of a complaint for fraudulent 
conveyance because clearly a conveyance occurred when a 
judgment was pending or had been granted in another court. 
Where you want to go with that, I don't know, but the Court 
will quash the execution at this time in this matter. 
Anything further? 
MR. FERICKS: Your Honor, would the Court entertain 
some additional discussion about that? 
THE COURT: I won't. 
MR. FERICKS: All right. 
THE COURT: If I'm wrong, you know, you can tell me. 
MR. FERICKS: With all due respect, Your Honor, I 
8 
think we probably will. j 
THE COURT: I think it's a point that needs J 
clarification. It doesn't bother me at all. 
MR. FERICKS: You know, our thought is that because a 
judgment has an eight year duration, the legislature had to set l 
up this sort of segmented process as they moved it over towards I 
the county recorder's office which became the single source of ! 
information after July 1, 2002. 
THE COURT: I don't think it makes any difference ! 
because I think the eight year statute runs from the date the 
judgment is granted in the district court where it originates, j 
MR. FERICKS: Right. 
THE COURT: So however they want to get it in any | 
other jurisdiction or to perfect that judgment, that's up to 
them, but it's still only runs for that eight year period and j 
that clock starts ticking at the time it's entered by the 
court. 
MR. FERICKS: Your Honor, just so that we have all of I 
our cards on the table, I don't want to play any subtly with i 
the Court, we have as a matter of fact filed an action for | 
fraudulent conveyance and we will be making a prompt motion 
with the court for a pre-judgment writ of attachment so that i 
that fraudulent conveyance can actually play itself out before | 
what appears to be a fairly volatile title. | 
THE COURT: You know, you may want - I don't want to ! 
1 ' advise you what you should do, but if you've done that, I 
2 I probably a lis pendens needs to be filed on that property also, i 
3 J That hasn't been done. 
4 I MR. FERICKS: We understand, Your Honor. 
5 ! THE COURT: But anyway, that's my ruling as far as 
6 | the attachment of the lien and its perfection and I would 
7 I really like some direction on it. To me it's clear, but it may 
8 have not been to the legislature. 
9 MR. FERICKS: Pardon me? 
10 J THE COURT: It may not have been to the legislature, 
11 but the way that the statute is worded it's clear to me and 
12 I'll be frank with you, we've discussed these things as judges 
13 as far as our training because of the significance of departure 
14 from what the law used to be as far as judgments and how they 
15 attached, and so we've talked about this among ourselves at our 
16 trainings and those kinds of things. 
17 MR. FERICKS: Your Honor, just to clarify the 
18 I rationale under the Court's ruling, is the Court declining to 
19 consider the legislative history as presented by the affidavit 
20 I of the sponsoring legislature? 
21 THE COURT: I am, because I don't think it's 
22 ambiguous. 
23 MR. FERICKS: Okay. Is the Court declining to 
24 J consider the county attorney's affidavit with regard to 
25 ! direction that he's given to the county recorder? 
10 
THE COURT: It's irrelevant to me. I think you're 
wrong. 
MR. FERICKS: All right. Your Honor, could we ask 
the clerk if we could get a copy of - I assume the Court's 
decision is on the video? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. FERICKS: Okay, we'd like a copy of that. We'll 
have a transcript created. 
THE COURT: What you should do is make that request 
to the court and then that goes to the court reporter and they 
make those. 
MR. FERICKS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thanks for appearing. 
Ms. Noyce, would you prepare findings and judgment in 
accordance with the court's ruling? 
MS. NOYCE: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You will circulate to opposing counsel 
before it's submitted to me. 
MS. NOYCE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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